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October Term, 1999: The Supreme Court's Last Term
of the Twentieth Century, Increasing Deference to
Administrative Agencies
By Professor Allen E. Shoenberger
1
The dominant theme last term in the United States Supreme Court's
administrative law decisions was increased deference to the agencies.
Those decisions run from esoteric, the right of an agency to have the
first crack at constitutional challenges to agency regulations, 2 and the
ability of an agency to adopt different requirements for unrepresented
claimants from those applicable to attorney represented claimants,3 to
the concrete, taking a $400,000 judgment away from a railroad crossing
widow, 4 or government confiscation of the value of range fixtures, such
as pipelines, from ranchers and their creditors. 5 Many of the decisions
were 5-4, evidencing the close division of the Court.6 Hidden by the
technical nature of some of the decisions is the growing activism of the
Court; judicial activism that rivals the Warren Court. How much further
the pendulum will swing in favor of unrestrained governmental power is
a serious question prompted by the decisions discussed herein.
INITIAL AGENCY DECISIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.,7 the Court
held that jurisdiction to contest Medicare regulations was barred from
the courts, at least in the initial instance. 8 In the first instance, a contest
1. Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago, and former editor of the Journal of the
National Association of Administrative Law Judges.
2. Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449 (2000).
3. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000).
4. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (1999).
5. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
6. Morales, 527 U.S. at 41; Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 344; Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, 529 U.S. 1 (1999); Nurse Servs., 525 U.S. at 449.
7. 529 U.S. 1 (2000).
8. Id. at 10.
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is limited to agency appeal proceedings, even for constitutional claims. 9
The Court's holding gave an expansive reading to a preclusion of review
provision in the Medicare statute.10 The statute declares that "[n]o find-
ings of fact or decision of the [Secretary of Health and Human Services]
shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency ex-
cept as herein provided."" This provision covers medical claims, such
as payment claims for doctor's visit. 12 The Court read the statutory lan-
guage broadly, so as to cover all contests, including constitutional con-
tests, while holding that § 405(h) makes exclusive the judicial review
method set forth in § 405(g). 13
The nursing homes in Shalala wished to raise claims in federal court
regarding new regulations imposing sanctions or remedies for deviations
from standards imposed by Medicare and Medicaid. 14 No enforcement
of the new regulations had taken place, so this was a pre-enforcement
challenge. 15
After inspectors find a nursing home in violation of substantive stan-
dards, deficiencies are divided "into three categories of seriousness de-
pending upon [the] deficiency's severity, its prevalence at the home, its
relation with other deficiencies and the home's compliance history."16
Immediate concern for the health and safety of the residents requires the
Secretary to either terminate the home's provider agreement or appoint
new management. 17 Lesser deficiencies may involve the application of
a civil penalty, transfers of residents, denial of all or part payment, state
monitoring, and other measures. 18 When a nursing home is in substan-
tial compliance, no more than the "potential for [causing] minimal harm,
the Secretary will impose no sanction or remedy at all." 19
The challengers raised constitutional issues claiming vagueness of
terms such as "substantial compliance" and "minimal harm," as well as
claiming violations of various statutory requirements which mandate en-
9. Id.
10. Id. at 8.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1998).
12. Shalala, 529 U.S. at 10.
13. Id. at 14-15.
14. Id. at7.
15. Id. at 1.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 6-7.
19. Id. at 7.
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forcement consistency, due process violations of the procedures them-
selves, and failure to promulgate the manual and other agency publica-
tions consistent with notice and comment rulemaking requirements.
20
The practical problem the new regulations presented to nursing homes
was that following the issuance of a notice of deficiency, the rules re-
quire a nursing home to present a corrective plan, or risk sanctions, in-
cluding fines and termination from the program.21 The Secretary posts
nursing home deficiencies on the Internet based on a record of past vio-
lations.22 Additionally, simple compliance harms the nursing homes.
By complying, the legitimacy of the deficiency finding remains uncon-
tested and increased sanctions are possible in later prosecutions.
23
The Secretary responded that nursing homes are rarely terminated,
stating that from 1995 to 1996, only 25 out of 13,000 nursing homes
were terminated.24 She also contended that penalties imposed in later
enforcement actions, based on findings that are unreviewable, are no
more severe.25 Nursing homes that feel they are in compliance can test
the lawfulness of the Secretary's actions "simply by refusing to submit
a plan and incurring a minor penalty."
26 Minor penalties are the norm. 27
Instead of permitting nursing homes to raise either constitutional or
statutory issues in court, the Supreme Court required them to channel
their disputes through the internal agency review system. 28 The stated
reason for the requirement of proceeding through the agency was
"provid[ing] the agency the opportunity to reconsider its policies, inter-
pretations, and regulations in light of those challenges." 29 Moreover, if
time is an issue, the agency may waive procedural steps and a court may
determine them waived in other situations.30 In essence, the fact that the
20. Id.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 21-22 (noting the Secretary pointed out that nursing homes are entitled to post
a reply on the Internet).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 22.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The court stated that the Nursing Homes gave "no convincing reason to doubt
the Secretary's description of the agency's general practice." Id. How that can be done when
the challenge is to new rules tainted with vagueness to the point of unconstitutionality is un-
clear.
28. Id. at 23-24.
29. Id. at 24.
30. Id.
11 11 1
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Council itself was unable to exercise these internal procedures provided
by the agency was irrelevant.3 1 Its members could.
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians32 held that internal
processes for challenges to Medicare reimbursement rules need not be
exhausted.33 These rules provided for higher reimbursement rates for
board certified family physicians for services identical to those provided
by non-board certified physicians. 34  Justice Stevens writing for the
Court construed the interrelationship of sections 405(h) of the Social Se-
curity Act 35 and 1395ii of the Medicare Act 36 (which incorporated
§ 405(h) by reference) as precluding judicial review of "millions of what
[Congress] characterized as 'trivial' claims. 37 The Court stated, "[t]he
legislative history of both the statute establishing the Medicare program
and the 1972 amendments thereto provides specific evidence of Con-
gress's intent to foreclose review only of 'amount determinations' - i.e.,
those 'quite minor matters,' remitted finally and exclusively to adjudica-
tion by private insurance carriers in a 'fair hearing.' 38
However, in Shalala, the majority distinguished Bowen as implicating
the possibility that no judicial review was available at all, rather' than ju-
dicial review after channeling the dispute through agency hearing proc-
ess.39 In Bowen, the private insurance providers were given exclusive
power to determine benefit disputes, but no clear statutory method ex-
isted for reviewing challenges to the regulations under which these bene-
fit determinations were to be made.4° In Shalala, although the matter
was not completely clear, the majority found that the Secretary's reading
of the relevant review statutes permitted judicial review after agency de-
terminations.41  Thus, judicial review was possible after both nursing
home termination decisions, but also for more minor determinations and
sanctions. 42
31. Id.
32. 476 U.S. 667 (1998).
33. Id. at 667.
34. Id. at 679 n.8.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1998).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (1998).
37. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 678.
38. Id. at 680 (citation omitted).
39. Shalala, 529 U.S. at 9-10.
40. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 677-78.
41. Shalala, 529 U.S. at 19-21
42. Id. Justice Scalia's dissent indicated doubt with whether Bowen is correctly decided
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Justice Thomas, in dissent, asserted that the issue is not just the pre-
sumption that there is judicial review, but also the presumption that pre-
enforcement judicial review is implicated.43  That presumption goes
back to Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.44 Accordingly, Justice Thomas
viewed the Court's precedent, Weinberger v. Salfl45 and Abbot Labora-
tories, as consistent with a firm presumption in favor of pre-enforcement
review; a presumption only overcome when a very minimal burden is
placed upon petitioners.46 Thomas wrote, "[d]elayed review ... may
mean no review at all.47 For when the costs of presenting a claim via the
delayed review route exceeds the costs of simply complying with the
regulation, the regulated entity will buckle under and comply, even
when the regulation is plainly invalid."' 48 To jeopardize the continued
existence of a nursing home to the "grace" of the Secretary "provides lit-
tle comfort to a nursing facility pondering [the internal agency] route to
judicial review." 49 Other potential penalties include daily civil penalties
and more intangible detriments such as disclosure of detrimental infor-
mation to the public, including posting in the nursing home and on the
Internet, which is likely to result in substantial reputational harm.
50
Justice Thomas disagreed with imposing a more burdensome hardship
test on ordinary ripeness doctrine for aggrieved persons who seek to
bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the Secretary's regulations under
the Medicare Act.51
STATE TORT LAW PRE-EMPTION BY FEDERAL REGULATION:
The application of a new presumption against pre-enforcement review
was one example of the Supreme Court's increased deference to admin-
istrative agencies. In an effort to apply the new presumption against
pre-enforcement review, courts issued several startling opinions relating
to the pre-emption of state tort law.
in the first case. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
44. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
45. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
46. Shalala, 529 U.S. at 50-52 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 33 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 42-44 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 48 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 48-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 50-51 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,52 the Court in 1984 refused to find
pre-emption of state tort law punitive damage remedies by the federal
safety-licensing scheme for nuclear facilities. 53 In sharp contrast, in two
separate cases last term, the Supreme Court found that the Department
of Transportation regulation pre-empted state tort law remedies.54 It is
now unclear if Silkwood remains valid law.
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,55 the Court found im-
plied pre-emption of state tort law by regulations regarding airbags in
cars. 56 As in Shalala, four Justices dissented - Stevens, Souter, Thomas
and Ginsburg. 57 Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin58 similarly
held that regulations regarding railroad crossing safety equipment cou-
pled with federal financing of safety equipment at the site of a railroad
crossing accident preempted a widow's tort action against a railroad. 59
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens dissented.60 In a separate concurrence,
Justice Breyer agreed with the dissenting Justices that federal minimum
safety standards should not preempt state tort suits, but believed that the
particular regulations did preempt.61
Geier:
The petitioner's claim in Geier was that Honda was negligent in fail-
ing to equip a 1987 Honda Accord with airbags.62 The diversity action
in federal district court was dismissed on the grounds that the 1984 regu-
lations63 gave Honda the option of installing airbags or other passive re-
straints. 64 The 1984 regulations required gradual phasing in of the
52. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
53. Id. at 249-56.
54. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
55. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
56. Id. at 861.
57. Id. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
59. Id. at 359.
60. Id. at 360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 359-60 (Breyer, J., concurring).
62. Geier, 459 U.S. at 865.
63. ld. at 877. Elizabeth Dole was the Secretary of the Department of Transportation
when the agency enacted the final rule. Id.
64. Id. at 864-65, 878.
safety systems.65 Beginning on September 1, 1996, manufacturers were
required to equip ten percent of vehicles with passive restraints.66 The
specific Honda vehicle involved in this lawsuit was equipped only with
manual shoulder and lap seat belts.67 The Supreme Court found that al-
though there was no specific statutory pre-emption in the instant case,
"ordinary preemption principles" applied and subsequently determined
that the regulations did pre-empt.
68
The dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens states:
The rule the Court enforces today was not enacted by
Congress and is not to be found in the text of any Execu-
tive Order or regulation. It has a unique origin: it is the
product of the Court's interpretation of the final com-
mentary accompanying an interim administrative regula-
tion and the history of airbag regulation generally. Like
many other judge-made rules, its contours are not pre-
cisely defined.69
Stevens found the majority's holding particularly startling since the
Congressional Act contained a provision that "[c]ompliance with any
Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does
not exempt any person from any liability under common law."
70
In effect the majority read the savings clause as a nullity, and inferred
tort law preclusion even though the face of the regulation itself did not
evidence such intent on the part of the Secretary.
Shanklin:
Shanklin did not involve an explicit savings clause in the underlying
statutory framework, nor did the underlying statutory framework explic-
itly preempt tort law. 7
1
The Federal Railway Safety Act ("FRSA") was enacted in 1970 "to
promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-
65. Id. at 878.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 865. The seatbelts were buckled at the time of the accident. Id.
68. Id. at 864-65.
69. Id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 895 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing what is now codified as 49 U.S.C.
§ 30103(e) (1997)).
71. Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 347 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20101 (1997)).
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related accidents and incidents." 72 In the Highway Safety Act of 1973,
federal funds were made available to finance the Railway-Highway
Crossing Program for the "elimination of hazards of railway-highway
crossings." 73 The FRSA provided that:
Laws, regulations and orders related to railroad safety
shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A
state may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation or
order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of
Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order
covering the subject matter of the States requirement. 74
The Secretary of Transportation promulgated several regulations im-
plementing the Crossings Program, including the design of grade cross-
ing improvements. 75 The regulation stated that "[a]dequate warning de-
vices [installed] on any project where Federal-aid funds participate in
the installation of the devices are to include automatic gates with flash-
ing light signals" if any of several conditions are met. 76 Such conditions
include: multiple main tracks; the possibility that one train might ob-
scure another's movement; high speed trains and moderately high vol-
umes of road traffic; the use of the crossing by substantial number of
vehicles such as school buses or trucks carrying hazardous materials; or,
"when a diagnostic team recommends them." 77 If these conditions do
not apply, the decision of what devices to install is subject to the ap-
proval of the Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA").78
On October 3, 1993, Eddie Shanklin drove his truck across railroad
tracks in Gibson County, Tennessee and was struck and killed by a
train. 79 The intersection was equipped with advance warning signs and
the usual black and white X shaped signs that read "RAILROAD
CROSSING." 80 Several factors were present at the fatal crossing site
that would have justified flashing light signals and automatic gates. In-
deed, no individual determination was ever made at that site concerning
72. Id. at 348 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 130(a) (Supp. 2000)).
73. Id. at 347-48 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (1997)).
74. Id. at 348 (quoting 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) (Supp. 2000)).
75. Id. at 348-49 (quoting 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)(i) (2000)).
76. Id. at 349 (quoting 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)(i) (2000)).
77. Id. (quoting 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)(ii) (2000)).
78. Id. at 350.
79. Id.
80. Id.
whether upgraded warning devices were appropriate.81
The district court rejected an argument that pre-emption precluded an
action based upon the inadequacy of the devices at the crossing.8 2 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding in effect that the railroad had a duty to
prove that the devices installed were adequate for the particular crossing.
Installation of the existing signs and markers were merely "minimum
protection," not necessarily adequate protection.
The jury assessed damages of $615,379, reduced by thirty percent for
contributory negligence of her husband to $430,765.83 It is obvious the
jury assigned predominant responsibility to the railroad for insufficient
protection at the crossing. 84
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expenditure of any fed-
eral funds on the signs that were actually installed pre-empted state tort
actions based upon inadequate warning devices. 85 In justifying its con-
clusions, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion discussed the Court's
previous decision in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood.86 In
Easterwood, the Court said the regulations contained in 23 C.F.R.
§ 646.214(b)(1) were not preemptive, nor was the statute preemptive. 87
However, with respect to 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3), the Court reached a
different result in Shanklin, concluding that when particular warning de-
vices are installed, state tort law is pre-empted. 88 In Easterwood, no de-
vices had ever actually been installed, even though federal funds had
been obtained, so the Court found no pre-emption. 89
The dissenting justices in Shanklin, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Stevens, believed that Easterwood held that federal funding was neces-
sary, not that it was sufficient to justify pre-emption. 90 Justice Ginsburg
correctly noted that because federal funds had not been spent in Easter-
wood, the issue remained open for consideration in a later case.91 The
81. Id. at 351.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 359.
86. 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
87. Id. at 659.
88. Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 353.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 361 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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devices installed in the instant case were the result of federal funding for
improvements at 196 grade crossings in eleven counties in Tennessee.
92
No state or federal authority ever found or expressed an opinion on
whether the actual devices installed were adequate to protect safety at
the site in question.93 The distinction the dissenters believed determina-
tive was precisely the position the United States took as amicus in
Easterwood.9
4
Thus, several Supreme Court decisions held that blanket pre-emption
had not occurred through either the relevant legislation or regulations
alone, and that something in addition had to take place to produce pre-
emption. Shanklin holds, in effect, that any federal expenditure for in-
stalled devices pre-empts state tort law, regardless of the inadequacy of
the particular devices. 95 Pre-emptive effect is conferred to the Tennes-
see Department of Transportation grant writers, subject only to the po-
tential check of FHWA approval. 96 As no individualized determination
ever took place of the particular site, it appears that the Supreme Court
has effectively delegated Congress's power to pre-empt state law to state
transportation planners, even though nothing in the statute or federal
regulations indicates any such intent.
Public Lands Council v. Babbit
The Court in Public Lands Council v. Babbit97 unanimously held that
the Department of Interior permissibly adopted federal regulations con-
cerning grazing rights on federal land.98 In effect, the case validated the
Secretary of the Interior's great discretionary power to make determina-
tions about substantial property rights, including the right to extinguish
such rights without compensation, and to require that private expendi-
tures inure to the benefit of the United States.
99
92. Id. at 360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 353.
96. Grant writers may never have seen the railroad crossing at issue. It is ironic that the
only specific fact based determination by any governmental entity regarding the adequacy of
the safety measures at the railroad crossing is the now overturned jury verdict. See id. at
353-54.
97. 529 U.S. 728 (2000).
98. Id. at 731.
99. Id. at 728.
Increasing Deference to Administrative Agencies
The case stemmed from three 1995 regulations' 00 that: (1) redefined
grazing preferences; 10 1 (2) opened up the eligibility of persons to re-
ceive grazing preferences beyond those "engaged in the livestock busi-
ness;" 10 2 and (3) changed the future allocation of ownership of range
improvements such as fencing, stock tanks, pipelines, and well drilling
on public lands. 1
03
After a lengthy discourse on the history of public land manage-
ment, 10 4 the Court analyzed the Taylor Grazing Act ("Taylor Act")
signed into law on June 28, 1934.105 The Court found that the Taylor
Act delegated an enormous administrative task to the Interior Depart-
ment, including the determination of the bounds of the public range, the
creation of grazing districts, the determination of the grazing capacity of
the districts, and the division of that capacity among applicants. 10 6 In
effect, local grazing decisions were delegated to local district advisory
boards made up of local ranchers. 10 7 Grazing permits were issued in
terms of "animal unit months" ("AUMs"). 10 8 Permits were valid for up
to ten years and usually renewed, as suggested by the Taylor Act.
10 9
"Grazing regulations in effect from 1938 to the present [make] clear that
the Department [reserved] the [right] to modify, fail to renew, or cancel"
a permit or lease for various reasons.110 Potential reasons for cancella-
tion include persistent overgrazing and failure to comply with the Range
Code. 111 The Department frequently reduced individual permit AUM
allocations so that by 1964 only "active AUMs" counted.1 12 However,
100. Id. at 738.
101. Id. at 740.
102. Id. at 745 (quoting the Dep't of Interior, Fed. Range Code § 3(a) (1942)).
103. Id. at 748.
104. Id. at 731-32 (citing RICHARD WHITE, "IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY
OwN": A NEW HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1991); WAYNE GARD, FRONTIER JUSTICE
(1949); and ERNEST STAPLES OSGOOD, THE DAY OF THE CATTLEMAN (1929).
105. One Senator described the devastating storms of the Dust Bowl as "the most
tragic, the most impressive lobbyist, that have ever come to this Capitol." Id. at 733 (citing
79 CONG. REC. 6013 (1935)).
106. Id. at 734.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 735 (stating that an AUM is "the right to obtain the forage needed to sustain
one cow (or five sheep) for one month").
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 736. "Active AUMs" are AUMs that are intentionally granted by permit,
minus AUMs suspended due to diminished range capacity. Id.
Fall 2001
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each rancher was assured that any capacity-related reduction would take
place proportionally among permit holders and that if the range capacity
increased, the Department would try to restore grazing privileges
proportionally. 113  As a result of such regulations, the ranchers
maintained that they possessed expectations in relationship to grazing
privileges; these well-founded reliance interests, they argued, not only
applied to ranchers but also to credit unions and other lenders.
114
The Supreme Court strongly deferred to the discretionary authority of
the Secretary to implement the underlying policies of the Taylor Act.
The Court cited 43 U.S.C. § 315b which stated that the creation of a
grazing permit "shall not create any right, title, interest or estate in or to
the lands." 115 The rights of the ranchers in such grazing permits were
not absolute, and the Secretary of the Interior was "free reasonably to
determine just how, and the extent to which, 'grazing privileges' shall be
safeguarded."' 16 The Secretary is directed to consider not only such
purposes as stabilizing the livestock industry, but also preventing injury
to the public lands. 117 Redefinition of grazing preferences without spe-
cific reference to AUMs, neither violated the Taylor Act, nor implicated
anything broader than "ordinary administrative leeway in adoption of
regulations." 18
However, while the Court recognized the broad discretionary power
of the Secretary, other actions by the Secretary regarding the new defini-
tions emphasized "that the new definitions do 'not cancel preference'
and that any change[s are] 'merely a clarification of terminology,' 1
19
and the ranchers had failed to demonstrate to the Court a single case in
which the recent changes had "jeopardized or might yet jeopardize per-
mit security." 120 Indeed, it appears that the Court effectively considered
the challenge an "on the face" challenge, and finding no clear harm,
relegated ranchers to the possibility of "as applied" challenges.
121
Moreover, instead of discussing the reasonableness of the Secretary's
113. Id.
114. d. at 741.
115. Id. at 741 (emphasis in the original).
116. Id. at 742.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 743 (quoting Range Management, Definitions, 60 Fed. Reg. 9922 (Feb. 22,
1995)).
120. Id. at 744.
121. Id. at 751 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
actions through rulemaking, 122 much of the opinion centered on whether
any specific provisions in the statute precluded the Secretary from mak-
ing the regulatory changes at issue.
The Court found that neither the new definitional regulation regarding
grazing rights, nor the regulation that omits reference to "engaged in the
livestock business," actually conflicted with statutory language.123 The
Court stated that: "[t]he regulation cannot change the statute, and a regu-
lation promulgated to guide the Secretary's discretion in exercising his
authority under the Taylor Act need not also restate all related statutory
language. Ultimately it is both the Taylor Act and the regulations
promulgated there under that constrain the Secretary's discretion in
issuing permits."' 1
24
Additionally, the Court denominated as unfounded the rancher's fears
that the hidden purpose of the new regulations was to end livestock graz-
ing on the public lands. 125 Grazing permits must be used, thus radical
environmentalists could not acquire grazing permits and effectively re-
tire them through non-use. 126 Failing to make substantial use for two
years is grounds for canceling the permit. 127 Further, explicit permis-
sion of the Secretary is necessary to place a permit into "temporary non-
use" for financial reasons.
128
The last challenge was a regulation that required title to all "structural
or removable improvements" on federal land to be given to the United
States government through a cooperative agreement. 129  Prior to the
1995 amendments, title was shared between the United States and the
permit holder "in proportion to the actual amount of the respective con-
tribution to the initial construction." 130 The regulatory change effec-
tively takes full title to all removable or non-removable structural im-
122. A concurring opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, with Justice Thomas concur-
ring, makes the point that although petitioners had presented an arbitrary and capricious
challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act in the district court, the claim was not
raised before the Supreme Court "for whatever reason." Id. at 751-52 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
123. Id. at 746-48.
124. Id. at 745 (emphasis in the original).
125. Id. at 747.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 748.
128. Id.
129. Id. 748-49.
130. Id. at 749 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-3(b) (1998)).
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provements in the future, even if virtually the entire cost of construction
was born by the grazing permit holder. 131 The Court found this was not
in conflict with the explicit statutory language in 43 U.S.C. § 315c,
which required a subsequent permit holder on land with improvements
to pay to the prior occupant "the reasonable value of such improve-
ments." 132 However, the Court accepted the Secretary's argument that
"the power to authorize range improvements pursuant to a cooperative
agreement - a greater power," also contained the lesser power to set
"terms of title ownership to such improvements."' 133 The Court cited
treatises in its decision. 134 If the Secretary denies that any private title
exists as a condition of all future cooperative agreements, then no title or
interest exists to which the requirement of reasonable compensation in
43 U.S.C. § 315c would apply. 135
Neither "contracts of adhesion" nor the Court's opinion suggests that
it makes any difference that the landlord at issue is the United States and
not a private landlord. In short, the decision in its totality represents
substantial deference to the presumptive "reasonable judgment" of the
Secretary. A brief concurring opinion, indicates that arbitrariness, while
raised below, was not properly before the Court.'3 6
DEFERENCE MAY REQUIRE A REGULATION LETTER RULINGS AND
UNPUBLISHED POLICY ARE INSUFFICIENT:
The Court decided several cases that initially appear to indicate posi-
tions of non-deference. Closer examination reveals that even these deci-
sions stand for the proposition that substantial deference is appropriate,
but only if the agency acts with greater formality in announcing its posi-
131. No change was made in the post 1995 regulations to title of structural improve-
ments made pursuant to a range improvement permit. Id.
132. Id. at 750.
133. Id. at 749 (citing ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND
TENANT § 5:31 (1980); HARRISON A. BRONSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIXTURES § 40
(1904); 2 JOHN N. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 554 (8th ed. 1887)) (emphasis in the original).
134. Id. (citing ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 5:31 (1980) (stating that "ownership of tenant improvements is a matter open to negotia-
tion with landlord"); HARRISON A. BRONSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIXTURES § 40
(1904); 2 JOHN N. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 554 (8th ed. 1887)).
135. Id. at 749.
136. Id. at 751-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
tion.
Christensen:
One of the few cases in which the Court did not defer to an agency
position was Christensen v. Harris County.137 The Court did not defer
to the agency position articulated in a letter ruling.
138
The Court in Christensen addressed the issue of whether public em-
ployers. can compel an employee to use accrued compensatory time.
139
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") originally did not cover states
and political subdivisions, but subsequent amendments extended its cov-
erage first in 1966, then in 1974.140 After the Supreme Court's decision
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,14 1 Congress
amended the FLSA to permit states and political subdivisions to substi-
tute a system of compensating employees for overtime by compensatory
time at a rate of at least one and one-half times their regular hourly wage
for every hour of overtime worked. 142 This was an alternative to paying
cash for the overtime. 143 However, there was a cap on the amount of
compensatory time that could be accrued. 144 After an employee reached
that cap, the employer had to cash out additional overtime.
145
Christensen involved the employment of deputy sheriffs in Harris
County, Texas. 146 The county became concerned that so much compen-
satory time was being accumulated that it could not afford to cash out
additional overtime. 147 The county wrote the United States Department
of Labor Wage and Hour Division asking "whether the sheriff may
schedule non-exempt employees to use or take compensatory time."
148
137. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
138. Id. at 587.
139. Id. at 576.
140. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat.
830, and Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1)-(2), 88
Stat. 55.
141. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
142. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 578-79.
143. Id. at 579.
144. Id. at 580.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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The acting administrator replied:
It is our position that a public employer may schedule its
nonexempt employees to use their accrued FLSA com-
pensatory time as directed if the prior agreement specifi-
cally provides such a provision. . . . Absent such an
agreement, it is our position that neither the statute nor
the regulations permit an employer to require an em-
ployee to use accrued compensatory time.14V
Harris then implemented a policy in which there were maximum
numbers of compensatory hours which could be accumulated. 150 When
the employee approached that cap number, the employee was asked to
take steps to reduce the number. 151 If the employee did not voluntarily
act, a supervisor could order the use of compensatory time at specified
times. 152 More than one hundred deputy sheriffs sued the county, claim-
ing that the new policy violated 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5),153 which re-
quired that an employer reasonably accommodate employee requests to
use compensatory time because this requirement was the exclusive
means of utilizing compensatory time absent a prior agreement or under-
standing permitting some other method. 154 The district court agreed,
granting summary judgment for the employees, but the court of appeals
reversed, holding the FSLA did not speak to the issue and thus did not
prohibit the county from using its new policy. 155
Before the Supreme Court, all parties agreed that nothing in the FLSA
expressly prohibited compelling employees to utilize accrued compensa-
tory time. Petitioners and the United States as amicus, contended that
the FLSA implicitly prohibited such a practice absent an agreement or
understanding authorizing compelled use. 156 Both relied upon the canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterius1 57 according to Justice Thomas, the
author of the opinion for the Court, though neither expressed the argu-
ment in Latin. However, the Court found the objective to be accom-
plished by the relevant statutory language was a minimal guarantee that
149. Id.
150. Id. at 581.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) (1995).
154. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The expression meaning "one thing implies the exclusion of another thing."
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some use of compensatory time would be assured to an employee when
the employee requests it. Such requests were to be granted subject to the
limitation contained in § 207(o)(5), that is, "if the use of the compensa-
tory time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public
agency."' 15
8
The remaining argument, and the most contentious part of the deci-
sion, concerned the application, vel non, of the doctrine in Skidmore v.
Swift & Co. 159 In Skidmore, the administrator of the FLSA issued a let-
ter similar to that in Christensen.160 The Skidmore Court addressed the
appropriate amount of deference given to the letter by the courts. At that
time, the administrator had no rulemaking power regarding the subject
of the letter.161 The Court held that such letters were "entitled to re-
spect," but only to the extent that those interpretations have the "power
to persuade."' 162 Petitioners argued that the deference applied by the
Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc.163 was more appropriate. Justice Thomas explained that Chevron-
style deference required a court to "give effect to an agency's regulation
containing a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute." 1
6 4 Jus-
tice Thomas wrote that agency interpretations not subject to formal ad-
judication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, such as the letter in the
instant case, do not warrant Chevron deference. In Christensen, the
Court perceived the position of the agency as an attempt to reinterpret an
unambiguous regulation under the guise of interpreting it, in order to
create a new regulation.1
65
Justice Souter's concurring opinion states that nothing in the opinion
prevents the Secretary of Labor from issuing regulations limiting forced
use. 16 6 Based on that understanding, Christensen only stands for the
proposition that an administrative agency may not accomplish by letter
rulings what it is required to accomplish by notice-and-comment rule-
making.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) (1995).
159. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
160. Id. at 138.
161. Id. at 139.
162. Id. at 140.
163. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
164. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 585.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 589.
Fall 2001 Increasin2 Deference to Administrative Agencies
230 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, asserts that it is time to abandon
Skidmore deference as an anachronism, dating from times in which the
Court refused to accord agency interpretations authoritative effect.167
This position existed before the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
and accounts for the exemption in the APA of "interpretative rules,"
which are neither authoritative nor subjected to the requirements of no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking. 168 Justice Scalia believes that era ended
with the Chevron decision, and accordingly, Chevron deference should
not be limited to the products of notice-and-comment rulemaking, but
rather be accorded to any authoritative agency position, including letters,
decisions, even a no-action notice published in the Federal Register. 169
However, Justice Scalia joined the Court's decision because he believes
the Secretary's position was not a reasonable interpretation of the stat-
ute. 170 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented, in part because
they disagreed with the majority's characterization of Petitioner's argu-
ment. 171  According to the dissent, the majority identifies the wrong
"thing to be done" under the canon, expressio unius.172 The dissenters
believe that the thing to be done is that the employer and employees
must reach an agreement. 173 Absent such agreements, as in the instant
case, the employer may not unilaterally force its position regarding the
use of compensatory time.1 74 Justice Stevens said nothing in his dissent
about either Skidmore or Chevron deference. 175
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to the majority, petitioners and the
United States, relying on the canon, expressio unius, contend that the express grant of con-
trol to employees to use compensatory time, subject to the undue disruptions of workplace
operations limitation, implies that all other methods of spending compensatory time are pre-
cluded under the expressio unius canon. Id. at 582. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a
canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of
the other, or of the alternative. This canon was eluded to in Petitioner's Amicus Curiae Brief
when citing,"[W]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a
negative of any other mode." Id. at 583 (citation omitted); see also Amicus Curiae Brief for
Petitioner at 270, Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (No. 98-1167). The
majority argues that the "thing to be done" is a minimal guarantee that an employee will be
able to make some use of compensatory time when he requests to use it. Christensen, 529
U.S. at 583.
172. Id. at 593-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 594 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. However, in a footnote, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Breyer's opinion of
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The separate dissent by Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Ginsburg)
disagrees with the thrust of Justice Scalia's suggestion that Skidmore
deference is an anachronism. 176 Justice Breyer asserts that Skidmore
stands for the proposition that the courts should "pay particular attention
to the views of an expert agency where they represent 'specialized ex-
perience."' 177 Such views, while not controlling, do "constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance." 178 Breyer opined, "Chevron made no
relevant change. It simply focused upon an additional, separate legal
reason for deferring to certain agency determinations, namely, that Con-
gress had delegated to the agency the legal authority to make those de-
terminations."' 179 Absent such Congressional intent, Justice Breyer be-
lieves Chevron is inapplicable. 180 Justice Breyer concludes his dissent
by agreeing with Justice Stevens' view that whether Chevron or Skid-
more deference is applied in the instant case, petitioners' position and
the United States should be sustained.
18 1
Ultimately, Christensen provides a road map for judicial deference;
indeed, it appears that all but Justice Scalia believe that the agency could
do what the solicitor asserted the agency already had done. 182 Only Jus-
tice Scalia believed that result unreasonable.
183
Christensen thus lines up as another decision supporting deference to
agency actions, even though the eventual result was contrary to the
agency's particular objective. Indeed, if the Court adopted Justice
Scalia's position, greater deference would be appropriate in the future.
Policy announced by an administrator in a luncheon speech to an indus-
try trade group potentially would have the force of law. Would an an-
swer to a reporter's question also have the force of law? It is hard to see
the limits of deference proposed by Justice Scalia' s position.
Chevron deference. Id. at 595 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139
(1944)).
178. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944)).
179. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 596-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 597 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 589-91 (Scalia, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Sims:
Another decision, Sims v. Apfel, 184 similarly indicates that some de-
gree of formal adoption of a policy is necessary before that policy may
permissibly be applied. 185 Sims concerned whether a social security
claimant must present all issues that had been initially presented to the
ALJ on appeal to the appeals council. 186 Sims requested appeals council
review on a single issue, but review was'denied. 187 Sims then brought
suit in federal district court raising several additional issues that had not
been presented in the request for Appeals Council review. 188 These is-
sues included whether questions posed by the AU to a vocational expert
were defective because they failed to include all of claimant's ailments,
as well as failure to order a consultative examination with a physi-
cian. 189
The district court rejected all claims on the merits. 190 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, but refused to reach these contentions because
they had not been presented to the appeals council under the issue pre-
clusion doctrine. 19 1 The Commissioner of Social Security took the posi-
tion before the Supreme Court that it had a policy of not invoking issue
preclusion if a lawyer does not represent the claimant. 192 However,
Sims had counsel. 193
Justice Thomas wrote the decision for the Court, reversing the Fifth
Circuit. 194 His opinion emphasized the policy of non-adversarialness in
social security hearings. 195 While reasons justifying the normal rule of
issue preclusion in judicial proceedings should also apply in most ad-
ministrative proceedings, exceptions exist.196 The Court held that when
184. 530 U.S. 103 (2000).
185. See id.
186. Id. at 105.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 106.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 114 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 105.
194. Id. at 104.
195. Id. at 110-11.
196. Id. at 109 (citing Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344, 351 (1983)).
"an administrative proceeding is not adversarial .... the reasons for a
court to require issue exhaustion are much weaker." 197 Social security
regulations make clear that "the SSA 'conducts the administrative re-
view process in an informal, non-adversary manner."' 198  The Court
concluded, "[s]ocial security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than
adversarial." 199
Justice O'Connor's vote was critical for the 5-4 decision holding issue
preclusion inapplicable.2 0 0 In her judgment, different policies depend-
ing upon whether a party was represented or not, was an "unwise"
idea. 20 1 However, Justice O'Connor wrote separately because the SSA
regulations failed to notify claimants of an issue exhaustion require-
ment. 202 She did not join the portion of Justice Thomas's opinion dis-
cussing non-adversarialness and the inquisitory nature of SSA proceed-
ings. 20 3 Lack of notice was sufficient to reverse the decision below.
20 4
Justice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. 20 5 The dissent finds inade-
quate justification in the non-adversarial nature of the SSA proceedings
to justify different issue preclusion rules from the ordinary judicial situa-
tion.206 Moreover, the dissent argues that "[p]etitioner's lawyer should
have known the basic legal principle: namely, that with important excep-
tions, a claimant must raise his objections in an internal agency appellate
proceeding or forgo the opportunity later to raise them in court." 207 The
Fifth Circuit precedent was squarely on point, so the lawyer was on no-
tice. 208
However, all nine justices appear to agree that if the SSA wished to
adopt issue preclusion, it could do so, although notice through a regula-
197. Id. at 110 (citing Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 560 (1941)).
198. Id. at 111 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (1999)).
199. Id. at 110.
200. Id. at 112 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. ld. at 114 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 113 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 114 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 115-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 119 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Paul v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 210-11 (5th Cir.
1994)).
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tion would be required. 20 9 It is unclear whether Justice O'Connor would
deny application of such a regulation if it incorporated the "unwise" pol-
icy of one rule for represented claimants, and another rule for unrepre-
sented claimants. None of the justices mentioned the practical reality
that many of the attorneys who represent social security claimants have
little experience with such cases and are unlikely to be adequately famil-
iar with social security regulations. Indeed, many attorneys handle only
one or two social security cases in their entire careers. Of course, for
those attorneys who specialize in social security law, a special rule
might be appropriate.
CONCLUSION:
The full set of administrative law decisions by the Supreme Court in
its final Term of the Twentieth Century repeatedly trumpet deference to
administrative agency discretion. Whether that discretion is exercised to
preclude state tort suits or seize investments in fixtures on federal land,
the Court consistently sounds maintains a steady drum beat; a drum beat
of deference. One is reminded of a statement from Judge Learned Hand
in the context of the legitimacy of judicial review of legislative enact-
ments: "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assur-
edly do not."210 Is there any reason to believe we are more confident in
our selection of agency personnel today, than in Hand's time? While
certain Justices appear to require a level of formal consideration in the
adoption of agency positions, Justice Scalia would vitiate any limitation
of Chevron to notice and comment rules. Will agency whim, or press
conference reactions replace notice and comment rulemaking in the fu-
ture? Only the next millennium will tell.
209. See id. at 108, 113, 118.
210. LEARNED HAND, J., THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LEC-
TURES 73 (1958).
